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Abstract 
Motivated by the April 2015 World Bank Publication on MDGs which reveals that poverty 
has been declining in all regions of the world with the exception of African countries, this 
study investigates the effects of a plethora of foreign aid dynamics on inequality adjusted 
human development. Contemporary and non-contemporary OLS, Fixed-effects and a system 
GMM technique with forward orthogonal deviations are employed. The empirical evidence is 
based on an updated sample of 53 African countries for the period 2005-2012.The following 
findings are established. First, the impacts of aid dynamics with high degrees of substitution 
are positive. These include aid for: social infrastructure, economic infrastructure, the 
productive sector and  multi-sectors.  Second, the effect of humanitarian assistance is 
consistently negative across specifications and models. Third, the effects of programme 
assistance and action on debt are ambiguous because they become positive with the GMM 
technique. Justifications for these changes and clarifications with respect to existing literature 
are provided. Policy implications are discussed in the light of the post-2015 development 
agenda.  We also provide some recommendations for a rethinking of theories and models on 
which development assistance is based.  
 
JEL Classification: B20; F35; F50; O10; O55 
Keywords: Foreign Aid; Political Economy; Development; Africa 
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1. Introduction 
Our interest in  focusing on Africa is twofold. First, consistent with Asongu (2015a), 
while South East Asian and Latin American countries have been experiencing decreasing 
levels of inequality, that of Africa has been increasing. Second, in light of a recent World 
Bank report on attainment of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), while extreme 
poverty has decreased in all regions of the World, it has been increasing in Africa. According 
to the report, about 45 percent of nations in  Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) are still off-track from 
achieving the Millennium Development extreme poverty target (Caulderwood, 2015; Asongu  
& Kodila-Tedika, 2015).   
 
Figure 1: Comparative regional poverty levels 
 
 The above picture contrasts with narratives of recent-growth resurgence in Africa from 
the mid 1990s (Fosu, 2015a, p.44; Alan & Carlyn, 2015, p. 598), inter alia: poverty in the 
sub-region decreasing in tandem with other regions of the world (Fosu, 2015a), or Africa 
being on time for the MDG poverty target (Pinkivskiy & Sala-i-Martin, 2014)
1
. This stream of 
the literature has been motivated by a strand on ‘Africa rising’ (Leautier, 2012) and/or an 
‘African growth miracle’ (Young, 2012) which may be more inclined towards extolling the 
rewards of capital accumulation and a neoliberal ideology
2
 by fundamentally neglecting 
issues like ecology, job sustainability and inequality (Obeng-Odoom, 2014). It follows that 
                                                          
1
 According to Pinkivskiy and Sala-i-Martin (2014), with the exception of the Democratic Republic of Congo, 
African countries attained the MDGs poverty target by 2014 or one year in advance.  
2
 The neoliberal agenda here refers to policies supporting extensive economic liberalization such as free trade, 
deregulation, fiscal austerity and cut-down in government spending. 
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Africa is still far from attaining the MDGs because its growth has been marred by rising 
inequality (Blas, 2014). The concern regarding exclusive growth in Africa has also been the 
motivation behind an interesting documentation of studies by Fosu (2015bc) which are 
devoted to elucidating: (i) myths surrounding Africa’s recent growth and (ii) the role of 
institutions in this underlying resurgence. 
The post-2015 challenges of sustainable development have clearly articulated the need 
for more inclusive policies (United Nations: UN, 2013, pp. 7-13). According to the narrative, 
development assistance is a critical factor to addressing this issue. In this respect, pitfalls of 
the past can be avoided, inter alia:   ‘Output may be growing, and yet the mass of the people 
may be becoming poorer’ (Lewis, 1955).  ‘Lewis led all developing countries to water, 
proverbially speaking, some African countries have so far chosen not to drink’  (Amavilah, 
2014). The celebrated ‘capital in the 21st century’ from Piketty (2014) has taken African 
nations to water again and this study partially assesses the challenging policy syndrome of 
how development assistance can help them to drink in the contemporary era (Asongu, 
2015a)
3
.  
The  above intuition is inconsistent with a  recent strand in the  literature which has 
raised doubts about the effectiveness of foreign aid (Ghosh, 2013; Krause, 2013; Monni & 
Spaventa, 2013; Banuri, 2013; Titumir & Kamal, 2013; Wamboye et al., 2013; Marglin, 
2013). According to this narrative, aid to developing countries is substantially motivated by a 
neo-colonial agenda (Amin, 2014).  A stance that is shared by (i) Kindiki (2011) who has 
recommended Africa to strategically limit its reliance on international aid systems and (ii) 
Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2013) on the continent’s entrapment in neo-colonial webs of influence. 
Amin (2014) has further emphasised that models of development in developing countries 
should reflect what is needed by poor nations, as opposed to what donors think is good for 
them. The need for developed countries to guide developing nations towards industrialisation 
in the view of Piketty is indirectly shared by Obeng-Odoom (2013) who has also 
recommended that policies towards development assistance should be guided by genuine 
needs in recipient countries. This strand is broadly consistent with aid literature on the need to 
                                                          
3
 Consistent with Asongu (2015a), foreign aid can be instrumental in preparing developing countries for 
industrialisation in the narrative of Piketty (2014) and not in view of Kuznets’ (1955, 1971); conjectures which 
sustain an inverted U-shape nexus between inequality and industrialisation. Accordingly, by focusing more on 
inclusive human development as opposed to growth, concerns of “immiserizing growth” (Bhagwati, 1958) can 
be tackled. Immiserizing  occurs when economic growth is associated with disequalizing income distribution 
externalities. 
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rethink foreign aid policies, notably the Eubank (2012) Somaliland hypothesis, Moyo’s 
(2009) Dead Aid and Collier’s (2007) Bottom Billion4.  
In the light of the above, a recent stream of African development work has presented 
cases for the appealing effect of foreign aid on African institutions (Asongu & Jellal, 2013; 
Kangoye, 2013; Efobi et al., 2014). Some conclusions in this stream include, among others 
that: (i) the positive effect of aid depends on a conducive policy environment, measurement of 
aid and specification of the aid-growth nexus (Gyimah-Brempong & Racine, 2014), (ii) aid in 
primary education positively affects growth (Asiedu, 2014) and (iii) in Sierra Leone, only aid 
reflected in grants have effects that are pro-poor, with the impact more apparent in the long-
run (Kargbo & Sen, 2014).  
The above strand is also a consequence of a number of qualitative and quantitative 
studies that have focused on reinventing foreign aid (Easterly, 2008). These include, among 
others: the experiment on ending poverty by Sachs; the World Bank and International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) Poverty Reduction Strategy (PRS);  the cost effectiveness of 
interventions  (Banerjee & He, 2008);  the imperative for more rigorous evaluation (Pritchett, 
2008); Randomised Control Trials (RCTs, Duflo & Kremer, 2008); amputation, 
intensification and policy change based reforms  (Pritchett & Woolcook, 2008); more 
articulation on ‘searching for solutions’ than on ‘planning for solutions’ (Easterly, 2006); 
APC or Advanced Purchase Commitment (Kremer, 2008);  novel initiatives at the global level 
(Radelet & Levine, 2008); ‘aid vouchers’ to provide incentives for better/competitive  service 
delivery by agencies of aid  (Easterly, 2002, 2008) and a broad range of measures for more 
inclusive policies on foreign land acquisition (Osabuohien, 2015).  
With knowledge that in the transition from Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) 
to Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), the policy debate has substantially shifted to 
inclusive development, the present study responds to the policy challenge of promoting 
inclusive development in Africa by assessing the role of foreign aid on inclusive human 
development. In so doing, the ‘questionable economics of development assistance in Africa’ 
(Asongu, 2014a) has also been clarified with updated data. The underlying study leaves room 
for improvement in at least three areas. First, it overlooks the heterogeneity of aid dynamics. 
Accordingly, three types of aid variables have been employed: total aid, aid from the 
Development Assistance Committee (DAC) and aid from Multilateral Donors (MD). We 
                                                          
4 There is also a heated debate on the effect of foreign aid on institutions in Africa. The interested reader can 
start from Okada & Samreth (2012) before exploring the plethora of studies that are focused on the underlying 
paper, inter alia: Asongu (2012, 2013), Asongu & Jellal (2013) and Efobi et al. (2014).   
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complement this dimension on variables by using seven different types of aid indicators, 
namely: aid to social infrastructure, aid to economic infrastructure, aid to the productive 
sector, aid to the multi-sector, programme assistance, action on debt and humanitarian 
assistance. The intuition for this complementarity is that the effect of aid on inclusive human 
development should depend on the type of aid because there are various motives behind it. 
These same variables have been recently used by Efobi et al. (2014) in clarifying murky 
empirical conclusions on the effect of foreign aid on corruption. 
Second, we employ a more robust methodology. The Two-Stage Least Squares 
method employed by the underlying study (Asongu, 2014a) fails to control for cross-sectional 
dependence and country-specific effects. We employ Ordinary Least Squares (OLS), Fixed-
Effects (FE) and the System Generalised Method of Moments (GMM) regressions. The GMM 
estimation is modelled with forward orthogonal deviations as opposed to differencing so as to 
control for cross-sectional dependence. Third, the effect of foreign aid on development may 
be non-contemporaneous. We address this concern by modelling aid as both contemporary 
and non-contemporary.  
The rest of the study is organised as follows. Section 2 briefly engages theoretical 
underpinnings. Section 3 discusses the data and methodology. The empirical analysis and 
results are covered in Section 4. We conclude with Section 5.  
 
2. Theoretical underpinnings and reinventing foreign aid for inclusive development  
The theoretical underpinnings linking foreign aid channels to inclusive development in 
developing countries build on two main theoretical views that have been documented to elicit 
Africa’s poverty tragedy on the one hand and the ineffectiveness of foreign aid on the other. 
First, Kuada (2015) has argued that a substantial paradigm shift is needed to understand 
recent poverty trends in Africa. The author has suggested that a ‘soft economics’ approach 
focusing on human capability development should be given more emphasis in relation to the 
‘strong economics’ paradigm based on structural adjustment policies. This suggestion for a 
paradigm shift is consistent with a recent theory by Asongu and Jellal (2016) on foreign aid 
policy which postulates that domestic and private investments (for economic growth and 
inclusive development) can be better achieved if foreign aid is channelled through 
mechanisms that reduce the burden of the taxation system on the private sector of recipient 
nations. The narrative of Kuada (2015) for understanding trends in  high unemployment, 
poverty and exclusive growth in Africa is broadly consistent with a recent stream of African 
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development literature which has responded to the MDG-related poverty trends by suggesting 
mechanisms by which foreign aid could be tailored to achieve more employment, inclusive 
growth and poverty alleviation (Jones & Tarp, 2015; Simpasa et al., 2015; Jones et al., 2015; 
Asongu & Tchamyou, 2015; Page & Shimeles, 2015; Page & Söderbom, 2015).  
 We briefly discuss why reinventing foreign aid for inclusive development is  
consistent with the celebrated literature of Thomas Piketty and Simon Kuznets. Asongu 
(2015a) has surveyed over 200 studies to make a case for the need to overhaul development 
assistance for more inclusive economic growth and development. The main focus of the 
survey is centred on the argument that development assistance should not be used to guide 
poor countries towards industrialisation in the perspective of Kuznets, but in the manner 
outlined by  Piketty. According to the authors, abandoning Kuznets’ view that inclusive 
development is achieved with progress in industrialisation on the one hand and placing 
inclusive development at the heart of foreign aid policies could lead to outcomes that are 
consistent with the post-2015 sustainable development agenda.  
 
3. Data and Methodology  
3.1 Data 
We examine a panel of 53 African countries with data from the Organisation of Economic 
Co-operation and Development (OECD), the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) 
and the World Bank for the period 2005 to 2012. The periodicity and aid indicators are 
consistent with those employed by Efobi et al. (2014) in clarifying the debate on ‘the effect of 
foreign aid on corruption’. The underlying debate is from: Okada and Samreth (2012), 
Asongu (2013), Asongu and Jellal (2013).  The dependent variable which is the inequality 
adjusted human development index (IHDI) is in accordance with that employed by Asongu 
(2014a) we also seek to clarify. The persistence of the dependent variable is also consistent 
with the choice of an estimation technique that involves the introduction of a lagged 
dependent in the specification. To this end, after the choice of the Generalised Method of 
Moments (GMM), a pilot assessment with preliminary findings shows that stretching the 
periodicity further compromises the validity of estimations; notably it results in instrument 
proliferation.  
The aid and dependent variables are summarised in Table 1. The summary statistics 
show that the variables are quite comparable. From the variations, we can expect reasonable 
estimated relationships to emerge. The aid variables are defined in logarithms to enable 
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comparisons in means and standard deviations. The development assistance data are 
disbursements of multilateral aid from DAC countries.  The employment of control variables 
proliferates instruments or limits ‘over-identification restrictions’ which substantially bias the 
system GMM results. Accordingly, for the purpose of limiting instrument proliferation, some 
GMM specifications have limited or no control variables (see Osabuohien & Efobi, 2013, p. 
303).  
 
Table 1: Definition of variables, sources and summary statistics 
        
 Definitions/ Sources Mean S.D Min Max Obs 
        
Inclusive 
development  
Inequality Adjusted Human Development Index 
(log)/UNDP, World Bank WDI. 
0.486 0.130 0.129 0.809 351 
       
Aid to Social 
Infrastructure 
Foreign aid directed for human development 
purposes such as education, water supply and 
sanitation (log)/OECD. 
 
2.012 
 
0.622 
 
0.113 
 
3.077 
 
424 
       
Aid to 
Economic 
Infrastructure 
Foreign aid directed at infrastructure like 
transport, communication and energy (log)/OECD. 
 
0.812 
 
1.201 
 
-2.000 
 
3.067 
 
415 
       
Aid to 
Productive 
Sector 
Foreign aid directed at the productive sector like 
agriculture, industry, mining, construction, trade 
and tourism(log)/OECD. 
 
1.017 
 
0.830 
 
-1.699 
 
2.741 
 
424 
       
Aid to Multi 
Sector 
Foreign aid directed at other sectorial development 
like rural development (log)/OECD. 
1.023 0.682 -1.699 2.541 424 
       
Programme 
Assistance 
Foreign aid directed towards program related 
assistance like food aid, disaster and war 
(log)/OECD. 
 
1.116 
 
0.924 
 
-2.000 
 
3.103 
 
350 
       
Action on debt Aid directed towards debt relief (log)/OECD. 0.535 1.310 -2.000 4.045 321 
       
Humanitarian  
Assistance  
Aid allocated for Humanitarian Assistance 
(log)/OECD 
0.894 1.004 -2.000 3.038 400 
        
S.D: Standard Deviation. Min: Minimum. Max: Maximum. Obs: Observations.  Log: logarithm. OECD: 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. UNDP: United Nations Development Program. 
WDI: World Bank Development Indicators.  The development assistance data are disbursements of multilateral 
aid from DAC countries.  
 
The correlation matrix in Table 2 enables us to mitigate multicollinearity and 
overparameterization issues apparent in the first-four variables; notably in aid for: social 
infrastructure, economic infrastructure, the production sector and the multi-sector.  
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Table 2: Correlation matrix 
         
SocioInfra EcoInfra ProdSec MultiSec Prog. Assis Debt Action Humani IHDI  
1.000 0.756 0.760 0.784 0.284 0.111 0.419 -0.184 SocioInfra 
 1.000 0.675 0.693 0.203 0.155 0.150 0.029 EcoInfra 
  1.000 0.733 0.304 0.112 0.262 -0.139 ProdSec 
   1.000 0.297 0.067 0.349 -0.189 MultiSec 
    1.000 -0.022 0.351 -0.359 Prog. Assis 
     1.000 0.006 -0.007 Debt Action 
      1.000 -0.553 Humani 
       1.000 IHDI 
         
SocioInfra: Aid to Social Infrastructure & Services. EcoInfra: Aid to Economic Infrastructure and Services. ProdSec: Aid to Production 
Services. MultiSec: Aid to Multi Sector Development.  Prog. Assis: Programme Assistance.  Debt Action: Aid for debt relief. Humani: Aid 
for Humanitarian Assistance. IHDI: Inequality adjusted Human Development Index.  
 
 
 
3.2 Methodology  
Consistent with the motivation, we employ three estimation techniques: panel OLS, panel 
Fixed-effects (FE) and Dynamic System GMM. While the first-two independently entail both 
contemporary and non-contemporary specifications, the third is simultaneously contemporary 
and non-contemporary.  OLS and FE are Heteroscedasticity and Autocorrelation Consistent 
(HAC) in standard errors. The choice of a FE or random-effect (RE) specification is 
contingent on the outcome of the Hausman test for endogeneity.  
The GMM estimation consists of employing the Arellano and Bover (1995) technique. 
Instead of using differencing in the instrumentation process, we prefer forward orthogonal 
deviations. Such a specification is more efficient in the presence of cross-sectional 
dependence to avoid bias in estimated coefficients (Baltagi, 2008). As shown by Love and 
Zicchino (2006), the employment of forward orthogonal deviations controls for specific-
effects arising from cross-sectional dependence. In this light, one period lags in the regressors 
are appropriate since they are not correlated with the transformed error term. Moreover, the 
adoption of one lag is also in accordance with the baseline OLS and FE non-contemporary 
specifications.  
The modelling is in line with Roodman (2009ab) and specifications are two-step or 
heteroscedasticity-consistent, because one-step specifications assume the presence of 
homoscedasticity. The validity of models is further verified by ensuring that the results satisfy 
diagnostics of post-estimation. In accordance with Asongu and De Moor (2016), the study 
uses four information criteria to assess the validity of estimated models. First, in order to 
investigate the absence of autocorrelation in the residuals, the null hypothesis corresponding 
to the second-order Arellano and Bond (1991) autocorrelation test in difference (AR(2)) 
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should not be rejected. Second, for the instruments to be valid, the null hypothesis 
corresponding to the Hansen and Sargan over-identification restrictions (OIR) test should also 
not be rejected. In essence, the Sargan (Hansen) OIR test which is based on homoscedasticity 
(heteroscedasticity) is not robust but not weakened by instruments. Moreover, the modelling 
exercise is tailored to restrict over-identification or limit instrument proliferation by ensuing 
that for each specification, the number of cross-sections is higher than the corresponding 
number of instruments. Third, the Difference in the Hansen Test (DHT) for exogeneity of 
instruments is employed to further examine the validity of the Hansen OIR test. Fourth, the 
Fisher test used to examine the joint validity of estimated parameters should be significant. 
For brevity, we do not present the equations which can be provided upon request.  
 
 
4. Empirical Results 
Table 3 presents contemporary and non-contemporary results. Panel A shows OLS while 
Panel B reveals FE estimations. The specifications are tailored to control for the 
multicollinearity issues identified in Table 2. Only FE estimations are relevant to Panel B 
because the null hypotheses of the Hausman test for endogeneity are rejected, confirming the 
presence of endogeneity.  
The following findings are established in Panel A. First, aid for program and 
humanitarian assistance affects the IHDI negatively. Second, there is no apparent impact 
from action on debts. Third, the effects of the aid dynamics with a high degree of substitution 
are consistently positive across specifications. Fourth, from a broad perspective, magnitudes 
of effects from non-contemporary specifications are slightly higher.  
These results are noticeable with the FE estimations in Panel B. First, the previously 
insignificant effects from action on debt are now negatively significant. Second, the 
previously negative effects of program and humanitarian assistance are no longer apparent. 
Third, but for aid to multi-sector development, the other three highly correlated aid dynamics 
have significant positive effects as in Panel A.  
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Table 3: Contemporary and non-contemporary OLS and fixed-effects 
          
Dependent variable: Inequality adjusted Human  Development Index (IHDI) 
 
Panel A: Baseline Contemporary and Non-contemporary effects (HAC SE OLS) 
 
 Contemporary  effects  Non-Contemporary effects 
          
Constant  0.410*** 0.499*** 0.495*** 0.472*** Constant  0.399*** 0.498*** 0.498*** 0.471*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Prog. Assistance -0.034*** -0.037*** -0.033*** -0.030*** Prog. Assistance (-1) -0.033*** -0.037*** -0.031*** -0.030*** 
 (0.003) (0.000) (0.004) (0.004)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.007) (0.006) 
Action on Debt -0.0004 -0.002 0.0002 0.0003 Action on Debt (-1) -0.001 -0.004 -0.0009 -0.0004 
 (0.954) (0.679) (0.971) (0.956)  (0.842) (0.537) (0.899) (0.955) 
Hum. Assistance  -0.052*** -0.041*** -0.043*** -0.047*** Hum. Assistance (-1) -0.054*** -0.042*** -0.044*** -0.048*** 
 (0.000) (0.003) (0.005) (0.001)  (0.000) (0.003) (0.007) (0.001) 
Social Infrastructure 0.062*** --- --- --- Social Infrastructure(-1) 0.069*** --- --- --- 
 (0.003)     (0.000)    
Econ. Infrastructure  --- 0.037*** --- --- Econ. Infrastructure (-1) --- 0.043*** --- --- 
  (0.000)     (0.000)   
Productive Sector --- --- 0.031** --- Productive Sector(-1) --- --- 0.031** --- 
   (0.036)     (0.039)  
Multi Sector --- --- --- 0.050*** Multi Sector(-1) --- --- --- 0.054*** 
    (0.003)     (0.004) 
          
Adjusted R² 0.308 0.376 0.271 0.290 Adjusted R² 0.316 0.407 0.261 0.286 
Fisher  27.22*** 36.47*** 22.926*** 25.017*** Fisher  25.31*** 37.06*** 19.57*** 22.08*** 
Countries  42 42 42 42 Countries  41 41 41 41 
Observations  236 236 236 236 Observations  211 211 211 211 
          
          
Panel B: Contemporary and Non-contemporary effects (HAC SE Panel Fixed-Effects) 
 
 Contemporary  effects  Non-Contemporary effects 
    
Constant  0.393*** 0.433*** 0.427*** 0.431*** Constant  0.408*** 0.443*** 0.436*** 0.441*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Prog. Assistance 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.002* Prog. Assistance (-1) -0.0005 -0.0005 -0.00002 0.0001 
 (0.251) (0.142) (0.103) (0.090)  (0.733) (0.721) (0.988) (0.932) 
Action on Debt -0.007*** -0.008*** -0.007*** -0.008*** Action on Debt (-1) -0.006*** -0.006*** -0.006*** -0.006*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Hum. Assistance  0.001 0.002 0.002 0.001 Hum. Assistance (-1) -0.0009 0.0001 0.0009 -0.0004 
 (0.551) (0.421) (0.354) (0.558)  (0.704) (0.957) (0.735) (0.879) 
Social Infrastructure 0.020*** --- --- --- Social Infrastructure(-1) 0.019*** --- --- --- 
 (0.000)     (0.000)    
Econ. Infrastructure  --- 0.003*** --- --- Econ. Infrastructure (-1) --- 0.005*** --- --- 
  (0.002)     (0.000)   
Productive Sector --- --- 0.007* --- Productive Sector(-1) --- --- 0.009** --- 
   (0.068)     (0.021)  
Multi Sector --- --- --- 0.004 Multi Sector(-1) --- --- --- 0.006 
    (0.148)     (0.104) 
          
Hausman  39.984*** 66.307*** 37.034*** 44.23*** Hausman  29.692*** 60.04*** 26.31*** 33.33*** 
Within  R² 0.341 0.326 0.331 0.312 Within  R² 0.264 0.288 0.281 0.246 
LSDV R² 0.983 0.983 0.983 0.983 LSDV R² 0.986 0.987 0.986 0.986 
Fisher (LSDV) 257.11*** 251.38*** 253.45*** 246.14*** Fisher  278.68*** 288.02*** 285.23*** 271.86*** 
Countries  42 42 42 42 Countries  41 41 41 41 
Observations  236 236 236 236 Observations  211 211 211 211 
          
***,**,*: significance levels at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. Econ: Economic. Prog: Programme. Hum: Humanitarian. 
LSDV: Least Squares Dummy Variable.  HAC SE: Heteroscedasticity & Autocorrelation Consistent Standard Errors. OLS: Ordinary Least 
Squares.  
 
Table 4 below presents the dynamic system GMM findings and comparative full 
specifications for further robustness purposes. The latter in Panel B is based on the relaxation 
of concerns about multicollinearity and overparameterization. Hence, all aid variables enter 
into the specifications. The findings which are based on contemporary and non-contemporary 
OLS and FE regressions confirm the results of Table 3.  
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Table 4: Dynamic GMM and comparative full specifications  
          
 Panel A: Dynamic Panel System GMM Panel B: Panel OLS and Fixed-Effects 
   
 Dynamic System GMM Baseline HAC SE OLS Fixed-Effects HAC SE 
 Contemporary and Non-contemporary Cont Non-cont Cont Non-cont 
      
IHDI(-1) 0.986*** 0.992*** 0.989*** 0.993*** 0.970*** --- --- --- --- 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)     
Constant  0.004 0.008 0.006 0.009 0.002 0.485*** 0.473*** 0.391*** 0.408*** 
 (0.400) (0.283) (0.360) (0.180) (0.605) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Prog. Assistance 0.0008* 0.0005 0.0009 0.0006 0.001*** -0.036*** -0.035*** 0.001 -0.001 
 (0.058) (0.244) (0.100) (0.103) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.365) (0.362) 
Action on Debt 0.0007* 0.0004 0.0008** 0.0004 0.001*** -0.002 -0.003 -0.007*** -0.005*** 
 (0.073) (0.323) (0.041) (0.343) (0.004) (0.690) (0.565) (0.000) (0.000) 
Hum. Assistance  -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.002** -0.043*** -0.045*** 0.003 0.0005 
 (0.210) (0.222) (0.306) (0.103) (0.019) (0.001) (0.000) (0.305) (0.836) 
Social Infrastructure 0.002 --- --- --- 0.006*** 0.004 0.015 0.391*** 0.012** 
 (0.195)    (0.000) (0.862) (0.520) (0.000) (0.033) 
Econ. Infrastructure  --- 0.008 --- --- -0.0001 0.036*** 0.043*** 0.016*** 0.004*** 
  (0.301)   (0.805) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) 
Productive Sector --- --- 0.002*** --- 0.0003 -0.013 -0.022 0.002** 0.006* 
   (0.008)  (0.686) (0.373) (0.167) (0.042) (0.098) 
Multi Sector --- --- --- -0.0003 0.001** 0.018 0.016 0.005 0.001 
    (0.757) (0.040) (0.356) (0.446) (0.117) (0.678) 
AR(1) (0.117) (0.114) (0.096) (0.119) (0.122) --- --- --- --- 
AR(2) (0.784) (0.516) (0.569) (0.918) (0.574) --- --- --- --- 
Sargan OIR (0.232) (0.143) (0.098) (0.243) (0.116) --- --- --- --- 
Hansen OIR (0.441) (0.497) (0.279) (0.364) (0.639) --- --- --- --- 
          
DHT for instruments          
(a)Instruments in levels          
H excluding group (0.650) (0.688) (0.587) (0.707) (0.470) --- --- --- --- 
Dif(null, H=exogenous) (0.303) (0.341) (0.180) (0.214) (0.641) --- --- --- --- 
(b) IV (years, eq (diff))          
H excluding group (0.311) (0.619) (0.368) (0.794) (0.500) --- --- --- --- 
Dif(null, H=exogenous) (0.565) (0.317) (0.249) (0.114) (0.708) --- --- --- --- 
          
Hausman  --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 78.01*** 68.23*** 
Adjusted R² --- --- --- --- --- 0.374 0.408 --- --- 
Within  R² --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 0.370 0.337 
LSDV R² --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 0.984 0.987 
Fisher (LSDV) --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 248.42*** 284.69*** 
Fisher  1835*** 1611*** 2033*** 2312*** 11324*** 21.083*** 21.718*** --- --- 
Instruments  25 25 25 25 37 --- --- --- --- 
Countries  38 38 38 38 38 42 41 42 41 
Observations  187 187 187 187 187 236 211 236 211 
£          
***,**,*: significance levels at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. Econ: Economic. Prog: Programme. Hum: Humanitarian. DHT: Difference in 
Hansen Test for Exogeneity of Instruments’ Subsets. Dif: Difference. OIR: Over-identifying Restrictions Test. The significance of bold 
values is twofold , (1) The significance of estimated coefficients, Hausman test and the Fisher statistics 2) The failure to reject the null 
hypotheses of: a) no autocorrelation in the AR(1) & AR(2) tests and b) the validity of the instruments in the Sargan OIR test. LSDV: Least 
Squares Dummy Variable.  Cont: Contemporary. Non-cont: Non-contemporary.  HAC SE: Heteroscedasticity & Autocorrelation Consistent 
Standard Errors. OLS: Ordinary Least Squares.  
 
As for Panel A, while the first-four specifications control for multicollinearity, the 
fifth specification relaxes the assumption. First, in relation to previous findings/modelling, 
while the negative sign of the humanitarian assistance variable remains unchanged, the 
effects of programme assistance and action on debt are now positive. The reason for this 
difference could be traceable to the drop in cross-sections from 42(41) to 38. This drop is 
accompanied by a decrease in degrees of freedom. Another possible explanation could be the 
result of controlling for time-effects. Second, the effects of the aid dynamics with some high 
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degree of substitution are positive, with the exception of the impact of economic 
infrastructure.  
The post-estimation tests confirm the validity of the instruments and absence of 
autocorrelation. Accordingly, the null hypotheses of the difference-in-Hansen test for 
instrument exogeneity and Arellano and Bond (1991) autocorrelation test are not rejected.  
After cross-examining the OLS, FE and GMM results, only the effects of program 
assistance and action on debt are ambiguous. The majority of the aid variables are 
unambiguous in terms of consistency in signs of estimated coefficients. Hence, in the 
concluding implications that follow, we urge the reader to consider the expositional/cautious 
character of the discussions related to the ambiguous-side of results.  
 
5. Concluding implications 
 
The use of foreign aid as a policy instrument to promote development in recipient countries 
has been the object of much debate (Gibson et al., 2014; Arvin & Barillas, 2002; Arvin et al., 
2002; Balde, 2011)
5
. We resist the need for engaging in the debate over whether foreign aid is 
generally good or bad. Such engagement would be irrelevant for two main reasons. First, 
development assistance is like a policy, whose outcome depends on its implementation. 
Second, while Donors may have some strategic interests, recipients also have their fair share 
of blame any fault in allocated funds.  
 The following findings have been established. First, the impact of aid dynamics with 
high degrees of substitution are positive. These include, aid for: social infrastructure, 
economic infrastructure, the productive sector and the multi-sector.  Second, the effect of 
humanitarian assistance is consistently negative across specifications and models. Third, the 
effects of programme assistance and action on debts are ambiguous because they become 
positive with the GMM technique. 
 Given the substantial reliance of the African continent on development assistance, the 
findings have implications for promoting inclusive human development with specific aid 
programmes. Hence, multilateral development agencies like the African Development Bank 
(AfDB) with a strategic focus on infrastructural development should be continuously 
supported by developed countries in their efforts toward infrastructural improvement for 
                                                          
5
 Inter alia: the interested reader can consider: (1) Efobi et al. (2014) versus (vs) Asongu (2012) and Okada and 
Samreth (2012); (2) Eubank (2012) vs Asongu (2015b) and; (3) Kangoye (2013) vs Asongu (2014b).  
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inclusive human development. Hence, given the established positive relationship between 
inclusive human development and foreign aid allocated for infrastructural development, we 
can only encourage the current strategy of the AfDB.  
The negative effect of humanitarian assistance implies that mechanisms by which such 
funds are channelled may be reconsidered. This is consistent with a study partially motivating 
this line of inquiry: “Though the stated intents or purposes of aid are socio-economic, the 
actual impact from the findings negates this. It is a momentous epoque to solve the second 
tragedy of foreign aid; it is high time economists and policy makers start rethinking the 
models and theories on which foreign aid is based. In the meantime, it is up to people who 
care about the poor to hold aid agencies accountable for piecemeal results” (Asongu, 2014a, 
p. 455).  
In the light of the above, we provide some recommendations for rethinking of theories 
and models on which development assistance is based. Drawing on Piketty’s  who has 
substantially debunked the Kuznets’ conjectures to which many foreign aid policies have been 
aligned, we suggest that developed countries should orient developing nations towards 
industrialisation by focusing more on inequality and less on economic growth. This is broadly 
consistent with an evolving narrative on inequality in Africa (Elu, 2013; Mthuli et al., 2014; 
Brada & Bah, 2014; Asongu et al., 2015; Anyanwu, 2011, 2014).  
By tailoring aid to focus on inequality instead of growth, there is some room for 
optimism that the transition from MDGs to SDGs would deliver inclusive outcomes from 
development assistance. This is essentially because the inequality elasticity of poverty is 
higher than the growth elasticity of poverty because the response of poverty to growth is a 
decreasing function of inequality. The underlying need to place more emphasis on inequality 
as opposed to growth has also been documented for the sampled countries by Fosu (2008, 
2009, 2010abc, 2011). We lift verbatim a few conclusions to support the policy 
recommendation: “The study finds that the responsiveness of poverty to income is a 
decreasing function of inequality” (Fosu, 2010c, p. 818); “The responsiveness of poverty to 
income is a decreasing function of inequality, and the inequality elasticity of poverty is 
actually larger than the income elasticity of poverty” (Fosu, 2010a, p. 1432); and “In general, 
high initial levels of inequality limit the effectiveness of growth in reducing poverty while 
growing inequality increases poverty directly for a given level of growth” (Fosu, 2011, p. 11). 
We do not resist the need to  provide some discussion on the ambiguous results from 
action on debt. According to Boyce and Ndikumana (2011), such action is motivated by at 
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least three reasons: (i) past debts have not benefitted the poor; (ii) borrowing arrangements 
were without popular consent and (iii) historical evidence shows ‘creditor awareness’ of 
recipients’ insolvency. Hence, a priori, the results are expected to positively impact human 
development because debt cancellation/reduction reflects positive macroeconomic 
income/fiscal externalities that should be reinvested  domestic economies to enhance human 
development. The ambiguity in results is broadly consistent with Asongu et al. (2015) who 
have confirmed the Azzimonti et al. (2014) conclusions that globalisation-driven debts 
increase income-inequality. Their findings, which are based on the same periodicity and 
sample (as in this study), show that the effect on inclusive human development depends on 
whether the debts are interactive with or endogenous to globalisation.  
Overall, while the findings are broadly consistent with Asiedu (2014), Gyimah-
Brempong and Racine (2014) and Kargbo & Sen (2014), they also raise some questions on 
previous foreign aid literature. For instance, humanitarian assistance which survives salient 
criticisms from Moyo’s Dead Aid has been established to have a negative effect on inclusive 
human development. Moreover the Fofack (2014) conjecture on self-reliance as means to 
African development is not consistent with the findings.  
As a technical policy implication, like in Efobi et al. (2014), distinguishing types of 
foreign aid is critical to advancing empirical conclusions on the aid-development nexus. This 
is essentially because previous findings using the same dependent variable that have grouped 
aid as a single indicator have shown a negative effect (Asongu, 2014a), a tendency that is 
consistent across conditional distributions of the dependent variable  (Asongu, 2014c).  
When the findings are considered in the light of the deep policy challenges of our 
time, the principal social implication is that foreign aid can be instrumental in inclusive 
capitalism. It could be used to avoid/mitigate the setbacks of the Kuznets theory and help 
developing countries embrace globalisation/industrialisation in the light of Piketty.  Foreign 
aid can be instrumental in inclusive human development if the above measures are 
considered, inter alia:  in (i) stimulating the knowledge economy which has been established 
to reduce inequality (Lustig, 2011) and (ii) emphasising gender equality. These are clearly 
avenues of future research that should go a long way to clarifying provocative titles like 
‘foreign aid follies’ (Rogoff, 2014) or sceptical conclusions from more substantive surveys 
from 40 years of foreign aid (Doucouliagos & Paldam, 2008, 2009).  
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